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Tax Shelters, Nonrecourse Debt, and the Crane Case
Tax shelters have evoked an abundance of journalistic speculation, expert
commentary and legislative action, but surprisingly few litigated cases. The
paucity of litigation is especially odd, since shelters seem to generate business
losses almost as rapidly as tax deductions, especially for surgeons, orthodon-
tists, accountants, lawyers and other gullible folks. With so many tax shelters
in ruins, why have we not had a flood of tax cases contesting deficiency no-
tices based on the theory that the unpaid balance of an investor's nonrecourse
debt is an "amount realized" on a foreclosure, abandonment or similar event?
Knowledgeable practitioners to whom I have put this question in recent
months have not been able to explain the dearth of deficiency notices and
lawsuits, but some have suggested that taxpayers may "forget" when a venture
collapses that the Internal Revenue Service is interested in the fact that their
tax deductions in prior years exceeded their cash outlays. In fact, taxpayers
who prepare their own returns may neglect to report gains when a tax shelter
collapses even if they have excellent memories. After all, the notion that a
business failure can produce taxable income is counter-intuitive, and so is
the idea that investors benefit when they are "relieved" of nonrecourse debt.
Tax experts can entertain both ideas with equanimity, to be sure, but we
listen to a different drummer.
What about returns prepared for taxpayers by professionals? I suspect
that it is not uncommon for them to disregard the possibility of gain on the
foreclosure or abandonment of a tax shelter on the authority of the most
famous footnote in tax history, note 37 to Crane v. Commissioner,l suggest-
ing that gain cannot be realized on the disposition of property subject to a
nonrecourse debt in excess of its basis, unless the taxpayer receives cash or
other property to boot. Fully recognizing that the validity of this idea has
already been subjected to analysis by many commentators,2 I want to make
still another assault on the citadel. As an incurable pedagogue, I hope that
" my readers will forgive me for beginning at the beginning.
Background
If the owner of mortgaged property is personally liable on the bond and
sells the encumbered property under a contract requiring the purchaser to
payoff the debt at the closing, it is self-evident that the resulting relief from
liability is equivalent to a payment of money to the mortgagor, and that it is
includable in the amount realized by him under section 1001(b). In Old
Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, decided in 1929, the Supreme Court held
that an employer's payment of an employee's federal and state income taxes
1331 U.S. 1 (1947).
2 For citations, see McGuire, Negative Capital Accounts and the Failing Tax
Shelter, 3 J. REAL EsTATE TAX. 439,440-42 (1976); Johnson, Tax Models for
Nonrecourse Employee Liability, 32 TAX L. REv. 359, 391-92 (1977).
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was tantamount to a payment of the same amount directly to the employee,S
and this hoary principle was later applied by the Court, in United States v.
Hendler, to a buyer's assumption and payment of the bonded indebtedness
of a predecessor company pursuant to a merger agreement: "The Hendler
Company [the seller] was the beneficiary of the discharge of its indebtedness.
Its gain was as real and substantial as if the money had been paid it and then
paid over by it to its creditors." 4
The same principle has long been applied if the buyer assumes or takes
subject to the debt, rather than paying it off at the closing,!; though this action
may be substantially less beneficial to the seller than an immediate discharge
from the liability. Since the seller's continuing secondary liability is a sword
of Damocles, which will fall on him if the property declines in value and the
buyer becomes insolvent, only a gullible taxpayer would accept at full value
the judicial assurance that an assumption of the debt (let alone a transfer of
the property subject to the debt) is tantamount to payment. If, on the other
hand, the seller does not worry about secondary liability because it is mini-
mized or eliminated by local anti-deficiency legislation 6 or because he is and
expects to remain insolvent, he is even less likely to regard the buyer's action
as the equivalent of cash.
Despite these shortcomings in the theory that the seller of mortgaged prop-
erty gets the equivalent of cash whether the buyer pays off the debt at the
closing or merely assumes or takes subject to it, there are good reasons for
not attempting to distinguish among these transactions in applying section
1001 (b). The economic value to the seller of the buyer's action in assuming
or taking subject to the debt is a function of many variables: (1) the amount
of cash paid at the closing, (2) the improvements that the buyer may make
to the property, (3) the probable value of the property when the payments of
interest and principal are due, (4) the likelihood that the buyer will be able
to make good on a deficiency judgment if there should be one, (5) the seller's
probable financial status if the mortgagee proceeds against him in the event
of default by the buyer and (6) other elusive imponderables. If these un-
certainties had to be weighed in determining the amount realized by the seller,
the computation of gain or loss on every routine sale of mortgaged property
would be plunged into uncertainty. Thus, while the buyer's action in assum-
ing or taking subject to a mortgage is not equivalent to payment in real life,
it is reasonable to treat them the same for tax purposes.
Nonrecourse Debt
The foregoing observations just described must be qualified if the seller of
mortgaged property is not personally liable for the debt, because he either
3279 U.S. 716 (1929).
4303 U.S. 564, 566 (1938). The acquiring company assumed the liability for
its predecessor's first mortgage bonds, current bank loans and merchandise ac-
counts payable; the bonds were paid off a week after the merger date, and the
loans and accounts payable were paid during the following month. See Hendler
v. United States, 17 F. Supp. 558 (D. Md. 1936).
5 Crane v. Comm'r, 331 U.S. 1 (1947) (reaffirmed earlier decisions to the same
effect) .
o See OSBORNE, MORTGAGES 702-24 (2d ed. 1970).
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acquired the property subject to the debt or borrowed against it on a non-
recourse basis. The problem of fitting nonrecourse debt into the statutory
framework can be illustrated by a simple example: Assume that a taxpayer
purchased Blackacre for $10,000, paying $2,000 in cash and taking subject
to an existing mortgage of $8,000, and later sold the property for $11,000
to a buyer who paid $3,000 in cash and took subject to the mortgage, which
had not been amortized and hence still amounted to S8,000. A businessman
knowing nothing of the Code would unhesitatingly compute the gain on sell-
ing Blackacre as $1,000, either by subtracting the purchase price of S10,000
from the sales price of $11,000 OI'-more likely-by subtracting the cash
paid out ($2,000) from the cash received ($3,000). Turning to section
1001 (b), however, it is not easy to see how the amount rC<llized by the seller
--defined as "the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of
the property (other than money) received"-amounts to $11,000.
Since the seller has no liability on the debt, and will not care whether the
buyer pays the mortgage at maturity or defaults, he is not likely to think that
he got the equivalent of $8,000 in cash when the buyer took subject to the
mortgage. On the other hand, the seller could not have effected a sale and
thereby converted the value of his equity ($3,000, in our example) into cash
except by finding a buyer who would either payoff the debt or take subject
to it For this reason, the buyer's decision to take subject to the mortgage is
as beneficial to the seller as actual payment of the debt, since one or the other
is an indispensable condition to his getting the $3,000 of cash from the buyer.
Indeed, the seller will often be better off if the buyer takes subject to the debt
rather than paying it off, since the buyer may be willing to pay a premium to
keep the existing mortgage in force on a nonrecourse basis. Thus, something
can be said in favor of describing the amount realized by the seller as
$11,000, since this reaches a rational result, even though it strains the words
used in section 1001(b).
In Crane v. Commissioner, .the Supreme Court bent the statutory language
to meet the perceived need. The facts, somewhat simplified, were that the
taxpayer inherited an apartment building worth $250,000, subject to a mort-
gage of the same amount, held it for seven years, during which she took
$25,000 of depreciation deductions (based on a claimed basis under section
1014 of $250,000), and then sold it, subject to the unamortized mortgage,
for $2,500 in cash. She reported $2,500 of gain on the sale, based on the
theory that (1) the property acquired by her from her husband's estate was
only the equity in the building, which had a value at that time of zero, en-
titling her to a zero basis under section 1014 (relating to property acquired
from a decedent), and (2) the amount realized for the equity when she sold
it was $2,500.7
7 This contention was manifestly inconsistent with her use of a basis of $150,000
in computing depreciation; and, had she prevailed in the litigation, the Service
would have been able to assess deficiencies for the presale years, subject to the
statute of limitations. An adjustment of taxes for the presale years would have
been relatively painless; according to the taxpayer's petition in the Tax Court
(Supreme Court Record at 7), the depreciation claimed was of so little tax benefit
that its elimination would have increased the taxes owed by the taxpayer and her
husband's estate (which had claimed the depreciation for most of the period be-
tween his death and the sale) by only $122.
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The government computed the taxpayer's gain in Crane as $27,500, argu-
ing that (1) the "property" inherited by the taxpayer was the real estate, not
the equity; (2) her unadjusted basis under section 1014 was $250,000; (3)
her adjusted basis under section 1016 was $225,000 ($250,000 less depre-
ciation of $25,000); and (4) the amount realized was $252,500 ($2,500
in cash plus $250,000, the amount of the mortgage to which the buyer took

















The Court upheld the Service's theory of the transaction. It agreed that
the property inherited by the taxpayer was the real estate, not the equity,
giving three reasons for this conclusion: First, the Court noted that the "ordi-
nary, everyday" dictionary meaning of "property" is either "the physical thing
which is a subject of ownership" or "the aggregate of the owner's rights to
control and dispose of that thing." 8 Second, the Service had consistently in-
terpreted section 1014 as using the term "property" in this familiar sense.
Last, the Court concluded that if property referred only to the taxpayer's
equity, the allowable depreciation deductions would be based on this amount
and would seriously understate the actual exhaustion of the property; more-
over, since the taxpayer's equity changes whenever the mortgage is amortized,
the depreciation basis would have to be repeatedly recomputed.
Having concluded that the taxpayer's unadjusted basis for the property
under section 1001 (b) was $250,000, the Court turned to the taxpayer's claim
that, her equity being worth nothing, she incurred no economic loss when the
property deteriorated. Reserving judgment on the validity of this claim if
the property had been worth less than the mortgage (which would have meant
that the economic loss from physical exhaustion would fall on the mort-
gagee), the Court held that in the absence of such a showing, the burden of
deterioration fell on the taxpayer, entitling her to depreciate the property.
This, in turn, required a reduction of her basis under section 1016 by the
amount of the depreciation allowed or allowable.
Finally-"at last," in its words-the Court turned to the phrase "amount
realized," as used in section 1001 (b). Since the taxpayer's property con-
sisted of a building worth more than $250,000, the Court held, in effect, that
the amount realized must have been close to that amount; limiting the amount
realized to the $2,500 of cash received by the seller would require accepting
"tile absurdity that she sold a quarter-of-a-million dollar property for roughly
8331 U.S. at 6.
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one per cent of its value, and took a 99 per cent loss." 0 The Court's inter-
pretation of section 1001(b) was, in essence, a by-product of its views about
the taxpayer's basis for the property and her concomitant right to compute
depreciation on that basis:
Petitioner concedes that if she had been personally liable on the mort-
gage and the purchaser had either paid or assumed it, the amount so paid
or assumed would be considered a part of the "amount realized" within the
meaning of [section 1001 (b)]. The cases so deciding have already repudi-
ated the notion that there must be an actual receipt by the seller himself
of "money" or "other property," in their narrowest senses. It was thought
to be decisive that one section of the Act must be construed so as not to
defeat the intention of another or to frustrate the Act as a whole, and that
the taxpayer was the "beneficiary" of the payment in "as real and sub-
stantial [a sense] as if the money had been paid it and then paid over by it
to its creditors."
Both these points apply to this case. The first has been mentioned al-
ready. As for the second, we think that a mortgagor, not personally liable
on the debt, who sells the property subject to the mortgage and for addi-
tional consideration, realizes a benefit in the amount of the mortgage as
well as the boot. If a purchaser pays boot, it is immaterial as to our prob-
lem whether the mortgagor is also to receive money from the purchaser to
discharge the mortgage prior to sale, or whether he is merely to transfer
subject to the mortgage-it may make a difference to the purchaser and
to the mortgagee, but not to the mortgagor. Or put in another way, we are
no more concerned with whether the mortgagor is, strictly speaking, a
debtor on the mortgage, than we are with whether the benefit to him is,
strictly speaking, a receipt of money or property. We are rather concerned
with the reality that an owner of property, mortgaged at a figure less than
that at which the property will sell, must and will treat the conditions of
the mortgage exactly as if they were his personal obligations. If he trans-
fers subject to the mortgage, the benefit to him is as real and substantial
as if the mortgage were discharged, or as if a personal debt in an equal
amount had been assumed by another.10
The Court was, of course, right in asserting that the owner of mortgaged
property must keep up the payments if he wants to retain the property and
that for this period of time, he must treat the debt as a personal obligation
whether he is personally liable or not. It does not follow, however, that the
benefit to him from transferring the property subject to the mortgage is the
same in both cases. If you crave gourmet meals, you must pay for them so
long as your addiction continues; but once you break the habit, you need pay
only for those you bought on credit in the past, not for those that you will
skip in the future. So it is with mortgages. Nonrecourse obligations can be
9 [d. at 13.
10 [d. at 13-14 (footnotes omitted). Referring to these observations, an imagi-
nary Supreme Court opinion acknOWledges: "It would have been better had we
stopped [before making these two points]. On both counts we were sadly misled."
Adams, Exploring the Outer Boundaries of the Crane Doctrine: An Imaginary
Supreme Court Opinion, 21 TAX L. REv. 159, 175 (1966).
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disregarded as soon as the property is sold, given away, or abandoned; per-
sonal liability persists even after the property has been disposed of, whether
the new owner assumes or takes subject to the debt.
Thus, Crane overstates the resemblance between nonrecourse and personal
obligations. On the other hand, had the Court established a legal distinction
between them, it would have produced some economic anomalies. For many
real estate holding companies, for example, the distinction is purely formal:
If the corporation's only asset is the mortgaged property, personal liability
on the bond adds nothing to the mortgage, unless the officer-shareholders
make the mistake of letting the rents or other income accumulate in the cor-
porate treasury, thus augmenting the assets available to the lender if there
is a default. Similarly, individuals who have no significant assets other than
mortgaged property (or who keep their other assets in a mattress) may well
regard the distinction between nonrecourse and personal liability as a
formality.
Thus, the Court in Crane bad to choose one of three alternatives: (1) a
sharp line between nonrecourse and personal obligations, which would often
not correspond to economic reality; (2) a case-by-case scrutiny of purported
personal liability in order to decide whether it is more like nonrecourse debt
than "true" personal liability, a process that would create a heavy admin-
istrative burden and foster uncertainty; and (3) uniform treatment of both
types of liability, notwithstanding their genuine differences. In opting for the
third of these approaches, the Court would have been more persuasive if it
had acknowledged that apples and oranges were being put in the same bin
for reasons of administrative simplicity, not because they were interchange-
able. Relief from a nonrecourse debt is not an economic benefit if it can be
obtained only by giving up the mortgaged property. It is analogous to the
relief one obtains from local real property taxes by disposing of the property:
Like nonrecourse debt, the taxes must be paid to retain the property; but no
one would suggest that the disposition of unprofitable property produces an
economic benefit equal to the present value of the taxes that will not be paid
in the future.
Although the benefit rationale of Crane is unpersuasive, the result reached
by the Court was justifiable because it brought the tax consequences of the
taxpayer's dealings with her property into harmony with economic reality by
recapturing her depreciation deductions to the extent that they exceeded her
investment in the encumbered property. The value ascribed to the alleged
relief she obtained from a liability for which she was not liable was, at
bottom, a balancing entry that was appropriate if-but only if-viewed in its
tax context. Like the tax benefit doctrine, the Crane principle is a creature of
the tax system, and it would be equally superfluous if the federal income tax
were repealed. In the absence of an income tax, it would be instantly obvious
that the taxpayer in Crane realized a profit of $2,500 on inheriting worthless
property and selling it for $2,500; and that her profit would have been ex-
actly the same if the property, instead of being subject to a $250,000 mort-
gage when inherited and sold, had been unencumbered on both dates or had
been subject to a mortgage of $1 million on both dates, provided the equity
was worthless when the property was inherited.
The facts giving rise to Crane were unusual: Not many taxpayers inherit
property worth the same amount as the debt by which it is encumbered, and
still fewer succeed in selling this type of property at a gain. But Crane's re-
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verberations belie its modest origin. By holding that nonrecourse liabilities
are includable in the taxpayer's basis for property, Crane laid the foundation
stone of most tax shelters,11 while the corollary of this basis rule-that the
termination of nonrecourse liability is an amount realized when the property
is sold or disposed of-is the booby trap waiting for tax sheltered investors
when their venture is wound up. Thus, tax shelters enable investors to deduct
depreciation, drilling expenses and similar items as rapidly as the expendi-
tures are made, even though financed by nonrecourse borrowing, hence ex-
ceeding their current cash outlay; but when the investment is sold, nonre-
course liabilities are includable in the amount realized in computing gains,
so that the deductions taken in the earlier years are-or should be-recap-
tured at the end of the road.
Debt in Excess of Value-
Footnote 37 of Crane
In Crane, the taxpayer did not contend that the unpaid debt exceeded the
value of the encumbered property at the time of the sale, and her receipt of
$2,500 in cash from the purchaser would have refuted such a claim. In foot-
note 37, however, the Court observed: "Obviously, if the value of the prop-
erty is less than the amount of the mortgage, a mortgagor who is not person-
ally liable cannot realize a benefit equal to the mortgage. Consequently, a
different problem might be encountered where a mortgagor abandoned the
property or transferred it subject to the mortgage without receiving boot.
That is not this case." 12
The implication of footnote 37-that the amount realized on disposing of
property encumbered by a nonrecourse mortgage cannot exceed its value-
may have been strengthened by the Supreme Court's later decision in United
States v. Davis, holding that the value of the property received in an arm's
length exchange can be determined by looking to the value of the property
given up,13 If property transferred in an arm's length exchange has no net
value (the situation envisioned by footnote 37 to Crane), the Davis doctrine
("you get what you give") would ascribe a zero value to the amount realized,
thus converting the speculative suggestion of footnote 37 into a rule of law.
But this would produce a startling result, which can be illustrated by as-
suming that a taxpayer purchases Blackacre for SI00,000, making a down
payment of $25,000 and giving the seller a nonrecourse purchase money
mortgage of $75,000 for the balance; that the value of the property rises to
$300,000, enabling the taxpayer to increase the face amount of the mortgage
from $75,000 to $250,000 (the increase of S175,000 being received by him
in cash); that Blackacre's value (unencumbered) then drops to $40,000; and,
finally, that the taxpayer transfers it to an incorrigible optimist subject to the
unpaid mortgage of $250,000. If the amount realized by the taxpayer is only
$40,000 (the value of the property), as implied by Crane, he will realize a
loss of $60,000 (Blackacre's cost of $100,000, less the amount realized of
U An autographed copy of this article is hereby offered for the best essay by
an Internal Revenue Service lawyer entitled "Pyrrhic victories I have come to rue."
12 331 U.S. at 14 n.37.
13 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
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$40,000), although his economic gain over the years was $150,000 ($175,-
000 of cash received on increasing the mortgage, less $25,000 of cash paid
as a down payment)!
These indefensible tax results arise only because footnote 37 of Crane
attaches weight to something that cannot possibly affect the taxpayer once
he disposes of the property, that is, its value. Whether the value of the prop-
erty at that time is just barely sufficient to payoff the debt, or falls short of
that amount, and what happens to its value thereafter, are matters of concern
to the mortgagee and the new owner; but the old owner has no reason to
worry about these matters. It has been argued above that the result in Crane
can be justified only if the amount realized by a taxpayer who disposes of
property encumbered by nonrecourse debt in excess of its basis is viewed as
a balancing entry, which brings the tax results into conformity with economic
reality. If this is its function, the amount realized should be computed by
reference to the taxpayer's adjusted basis, the amount of the nonrecourse debt,
and the cash or other property (if any) received by him. If it falls out that
the property is worth less than the debt, that is the lender's misfortune; but
this should no more affect the taxpay~r's tax returns than it affects his eco-
nomic position.
Conclusion
Nonrecourse debt can exceed the adjusted basis of the encumbered prop-
erty because the taxpayer (or a predecessor in interest) (1) borrowed against
the property, pledging it as security for the loan, and/or (2) expensed, de-
preciated or amortized the property in an amount exceeding his cash outlay.
In the first situation, the borrowed funds were excluded from the debtor's
income when received on an assumption-that the offsetting liability would
ultimately be discharged by payment of the debt-that, in retrospect, has
proved erroneous. In the second situation, deductions were allowed on a
similar assumption-that they were required to restore the taxpayer's capital
outlay-that has, similarly, proved to be erroneous. In either case, a balanc-
ing entry-inclusion of the excess amount in gross income-is required when
the taxpayer closes his account with the Service by disposing of the property,
without regard to the value of the property at that time.
Though it reached the right result, Crane introduced confusion into this
area by asserting that taxpayers receive a "benefit" on disposing of property
subject to nonrecourse debt. Since taxpayers cannot benefit from being "re-
lieved" of liabilities for which they are not liable, the contrary theory of
Crane was bound, as footnote 37 demonstrates, to generate anomalies. To
cope adequately with tax shelters, the government and the courts wiII have to
develop a theory, akin to the tax benefit doctrine, that is not dependent on
the value of the encumbered property when it is foreclosed, abandoned or
otherwise disposed of. A few straws can be detected in the wind, but they
have not yet been woven into a coherent alternative to footnote 37.14
BORIS I. BITTKER *
14 See Woodsam Assocs., Inc. v. Comm'r, 198 F.2d 356 (2d Cir. 1952); Gavin
S. Millar, 67 T.C. 656 (1977) (gain realized on surrender of stock in discharge
of nonrecourse debt, regardless of the stock's fair market value); Mendham Corp.,
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9 T.C. 320 (1947). Revenue Ruling 76-111, 1976-1 C.B. 214, disregarded the
value of property encumbered by a purchase money obligation in eltcess of basis
in determining the owner's gain or loss on transferring the property back to the
seller in settlement of the debt, but it sidesteps footnote 37 ("whatever inference
may be drawn from footnote 37 in the Crane case"), without offering an alterna-
tive rationale. Moreover, only a year later, the Service cited Crane in support of
the proposition that nonrecourse debt in excess of the value of the encumbered
property is less significant than debt for which the taxpayer is personally liable;
while the point is true enough, reliance on Crane helps to perpetuate its anoma-
lous ramifications. See Rev. RuI. 77-110, 1977-1 C.B.7. There have been earlier
suggestions that tax benefit or cancellation of indebtedness principles should sup-
plement the economic benefit rationale espoused by Crane. See, e.g., Adams, Ex-
ploring the Outer Boundaries of the Crane Doctrine: An Imaginary Supreme
Court Opinion, 21 TAX L. REV. 159 (1966); Del Cotto, Basis and Amount Re-
alized under Crane: A Current View of Some Tax Effects in Mortgage Financing,
118 U. PA. L. REv. 69, 85-86 (1969); McGuire, Negatil'e Capital Accounts and
the Failing Tax Shelter, 3 J. REAL EsTATE TAX. 439, 448 (1976); Rollyson, Re-
cent Cases and Rulings-Service Tums the Tables on the Crane Doctrine, 3 J.
REAL EsTATE TAX. 495 (1976). As the text of this article indicates, in my view,
the economic benefit theory should be rejected as wholly fallacious, in order to
make way for a more comprehensive balancing entry theory.
* Sterling Professor of Law, Yale University.
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